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ABSTRACT 
 
This article examines the Access Order theories of development that have emerged 
as the latest reformulation of New Institutional Economics by Douglass North and 
his associates. They claim that Access Order theory represents a radical break from 
previous models of institutional change in developing countries. They argue that at 
the heart of development is the problem of controlling organized violence. Two 
distinct social orders, the Limited Access Order and the Open Access Order, have 
emerged as solutions to the problem of endemic violence. This article traces the 
evolution of these new ideas within North’s institutional theory and examines how 
violence is treated within their framework. The article evaluates the underlying 
economic model on which the theory is based and argues that the conceptual device 
of the Open Access Order preserves key features of the neoclassical approach within 
North's work. The article contrasts the Access Order approach to the political 
settlements framework. To conclude the article argues that the Access Order 
approach serves to strip the progressive potential out of development by ignoring 
how controlling violence may affect capabilities, rights and freedom. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Good governance has been the dominant theme in the discourse on politics and economic 
performance in developing countries for international development institutions and large parts 
of academia for more than two decades. Although sections of academia have always been 
sceptical of the good governance agenda and its theoretical underpinnings in new institutional 
economics, its hegemonic position is now also increasingly questioned by the mainstream. The 
search for new theoretical directions on governance pre-dates the recent re-examination of 
received economic wisdom triggered by the global financial crisis (Hodgson 2009). Rather, its 
roots lie in a slow build up of evidence and experience that have challenged the axioms of good 
governance in a number of ways. The growing critique has focussed on the problems of 
measuring institutions and institutional quality, the validity of econometric data on governance, 
the (im)-possibility of importing institutions from the West, particularly in the light of experience 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the rise of alternative models of governance and good economic 
performance from Asia (Glaeser et al 2004, Gray 2007, Khan 2002, Knack 2006, Rodrik 2008).    
The challenge of these ‘anomalies’, in Kuhnian terms, have generated a number of responses, 
most of which focus on the pace and form of institutional change while sustaining important 
underlying aspects of the good governance paradigm. Dani Rodrik’s influential work (2008) 
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provides a good measure of the parameters of the mainstream in this regard. He argues that 
there is a distinction between the function and form of institutions, thus maintaining the view 
that the main elements of good governance – secure generalized property rights and accountable 
transparent political systems – are the critical ingredients for improved economic performance in 
developing countries, while taking on various forms depending on the specific context (Rodrik 
2004). A similar approach is found in the ‘good enough’ governance agenda (Grindle 2004, 2007) 
that calls for a staged implementation of good governance reforms recognizing the unique 
characteristics of state capacities and political constraints. Over time, these criticisms have 
filtered through to the policy sphere, as is evident, for example, in a number of World 
Development Reports (World Bank 2007, 2011) that have distanced themselves from some of 
the earlier claims of the good governance agenda typified by the 2002 World Development 
Report Building Institutions for Markets.    
Within these competing claims to theoretical innovation, North’s new work on violence and 
social order merits particular examination. The corpus of North’s co-authored work on this 
topic, which is made up of two books and numerous working papers and articles (2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2012)1, aims ‘to provide a new framework for interpreting the course of human 
history over the past ten thousand years, and to open new ways of thinking about the pressing 
problems of political and economic development facing the world today’ (xiii, 2008). In this 
article, I refer to North et al’s new work as a theory of Access Orders. Their main critique of the 
prevailing thinking on governance starts from the observation that institutions work in strikingly 
different ways in developing and developed countries. This observation, they argue, is shared by 
a number of contemporary social scientists, including those most associated with the mainstream 
cannon on development and institutions – for example, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, 
Paul Collier and William Easterly (North et al 2012, 2). However, they argue that the 
distinctiveness of their approach is in providing a systematic explanation for these differences by 
placing the problem of organized violence at the heart of development.  
According to their theory, two fundamentally different types of social order exist in the 
contemporary world which control violence in unique ways: the Limited Access Order, 
encompassing all contemporary developing countries and past societies with settled agriculture, 
and the Open Access Order, that is found only in the handful of rich countries that are members 
of the OECD. In Limited Access Orders violence is controlled by limiting access to economic 
and political organizations and thus creating rents. These rents are then distributed to powerful 
groups to incentivize their peaceful co-operation within the existing order. In contrast, a virtuous 
cycle in Open Access Orders ensures that competition, open access to organizations and the 
generalized rule of law minimizes violence, promotes stability and generates economic growth. 
Thus, they propose that ‘development tools based on first world experiences are ill-suited to the 
development goals in third world countries’ (2007; 1). Development policy, therefore, needs to 
focus on how the state can solidify itself and maintain or strengthen its control over violence 
and, eventually, how to support a legal framework for non-state organizations to exist and 
proliferate in order to eventually develop into an Open Access Order.    
The importance of critically engaging with the newest of North’s new institutional theories is 
threefold. First, North is widely recognized as the key intellectual figure within new institutional 
economics and his work was arguably the most important contribution to the theoretical 
                                                          
1
 The new framework was initially set out in a joint paper by Douglass North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry 
Weingast (2006) and in Violence and Social Orders (2009). Stephen Webb has also been associated with the 
development of these theories and was a co-author of In The Shadow of Violence (2012), an edited collection of essays 
that applies the Access Order theories to a set of countries. 
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framework of the good governance agenda2. The Access Order theories are presented as 
breaking with a number of his long held theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, these new 
theories also appear to reassert important features of his underlying analytical framework which 
is rooted in neoclassical economics. The claim that these theories are new, therefore, needs to be 
critically evaluated. Second, North’s work is generally characterized as a theory of history, but the 
Access Order theories are explicitly presented as a theory of contemporary development with 
important implications for development policy. The Access Order theories have already found 
themselves in wide circulation in academia and in policy discussion. This is evident, for example, 
from the 2011 World Development Report that draws heavily on the Access Order framework. 
As yet, however, very little analysis of the implications of these new theories for development 
policy has been undertaken. The article contributes to this end by examining the extent to which 
the Access Order theories sustain or challenge core elements of the existing good governance 
paradigm. Third, although North and his associates present their ideas as a distinctively new 
theory of social and economic change, the article examines the extent to which the emergence 
and content of these theories also reflects changes within the broader framing of international 
development over the past decade, in particular the rise of the idea of development-as-security.  
  This article proceeds through five sections. I first explain the main theoretical logic of the 
Access Order theory of development. The second section sets out the trajectory of North’s 
intellectual journey. It traces the development of the concepts within the Access Order 
framework from his earlier work arguing that while he has modified many of his initial 
neoclassical assumptions his understanding of society is still attached to an underlying set of 
assumptions about rationality, optimization and the primacy of the free market. In the third 
section I examine the characterization of violence by North and his associates as the key 
problem of development and situate their approach within other theoretical approaches to 
violence and development. The article then turns to the economic theory embedded in the 
model and sets out the limitations of their approach to understanding economic transformation 
and the relationship between violence and economic change. I argue that their division of the 
world into Limited and Open Access systems allows them to preserve the primacy of 
competitive rent-free markets as the counterfactual against which the real world should be 
judged. Finally the article contrasts the Access Order approach to the political settlements theory 
of development. To conclude, I argue that the Access Order theories present an important 
challenge to the existing dominant paradigm of good governance. However, while North et al 
identify the right concepts to place at the heart of the study of development – conflict, power, 
organization, institutions, economic change and ideas – these can only be partially understood 
within the a-historical logic of individual maximization on which their framework rests.  
THE LOGIC OF ACCESS ORDERS  
North et al argue that their new work on Access Orders presents a radical departure from 
previous theories that explain the relationship between politics, economics and development. 
Their claim to originality rests on their understanding of the role of violence and their rejection 
of the Weberian idea that the most important characteristic of modern states where political 
order prevails over civil war is a collective agreement that the state alone holds the legitimate 
control over violence. In contrast, the theoretical starting point for the Access Order theory of 
development is the assertion that no single organization, institution or individual ever holds a 
monopoly on violence; instead, the capacity for violence between different groups is an 
                                                          
2
 Governance is a broad term that draws on a number of different schools of thought but the influence of new 
institutional economics is particularly important within the donor policy-oriented engagement with the concept 
where governance is understood as primarily concerning the state structures that support accountability. As 
Doornbush points out, there has been a much wider engagement with the concept of governance in academic 
approaches that are not restricted to the theoretical framework of new institutional economics. 
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inevitable feature of both ordered and disordered societies.  The solution to the problem of the 
inherent and diffuse capacity for violence within all human societies, they argue, is to be found in 
the structure of institutions and the material incentives that institutions create. Thus, at the heart 
of their new approach is the argument that for humans to live in viable social groups, institutions 
that create constraints and incentive mechanisms to control the inherent potential for violence 
between members of the group are needed.    
The ability of individuals ‘to control the violence of others depends on the structure and 
maintenance of relationships amongst powerful individuals’ (2009, 18). What they mean by 
relationships is the institutionalized mechanisms through which people can bargain over material 
rewards and punishments. The powerful individuals of Access Orders belong to elites, which 
become the principle political actors because of their advantages in leadership, whether material 
or other, that allow them to mobilize group violence to achieve their own material objectives. 
Despite their claims to theoretical originality, their understanding of development draws heavily 
on the widely used neo-patrimonial approach to politics in developing countries3, which argues 
that elites maintain control over their clients through personal ties. Thus, the power of any 
organization in a developing country depends on the personal identity of the organization’s 
leadership and the ability of elites to distribute material rewards to their clients in return for 
support. The reason why elites wish to control the violence of other elites, according to their 
theory, is that violence creates uncertainty and destroys production; hence, there is a trade-off 
between the level of violence and the rate of economic development. Elites wish to maximize 
their returns but they can only do this if they can successfully constrain the potential violence of 
other elites.  Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) also characterize politics as being a process of elite 
bargaining but in their approach elites are driven by their desire to maximize profits alone, not 
under the threat of potential violence by other elites.  
In Violence and Social Order, they define a social order as ‘the way societies craft institutions that 
support the existence of specific forms of human organization, the way societies limit or open 
access to those organizations, and through the incentives created by the pattern of organization’ 
(2009 1). They argue that over the entirety of human history there have been three different 
social orders that have emerged each with distinct mechanisms for controlling violence: the 
Foraging Order, the Limited Access Order and the Open Access Order. In the Foraging Order, 
consisting of ‘small social groups characteristic of hunter-gatherer societies’ (2009, 2), levels of 
violence were very high and were only controlled through repeated personal contacts within 
small groups. In societies based on larger groups such personal connections are no longer viable 
and two distinct patterns of social institution – rules and organizations supported by distinct 
belief systems – developed over time to control violence. The Limited Access Order and the 
Open Access Order both generate lower levels of violence than the Foraging Order. However, 
the role formal and informal institutions play in constraining violence varies in fundamental ways 
between the two orders due to different underlying incentives systems created by the structure of 
competition between elites.    
In Limited Access Orders, violence is contained by setting limits on rights to form organizations. 
Organizations, according to North’s long-standing definition, include firms, political parties, 
trade unions, religious congregations and universities, where individuals are bound together by a 
common purpose. Restricting access to the establishment of organizations generates rents for 
those who have the right to be part of an organization. The rights to these augmented income 
flows that are generated by limiting the supply of organizations are then distributed to powerful 
                                                          
3
 Building on Weber’s ideal types, the neo-patrimonial approach as exemplified in the work of Bates (1983), Chabal 
and Daloz (1989) and Kang (2003) argues that politics operates through patron-client relations rather than the legal 
and formal structure of the state because of underlying socio-cultural features of developing countries.  
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individuals to incentivize co-operation between different elites. When elites are able to reach an 
agreement about how rents should be distributed between each other they are able to form a 
ruling coalition that can dominate the formal institutions of the state and maintain control over 
the distribution of rights to rents. If the flow of incomes generated by control of rents is not in 
line with the violence capacity of different elites, powerful factions of the ruling elite will resort 
to violence until their demands for a redistribution of rights within the ruling coalition are met. A 
successful distribution of rents between elites that generates stability does not depend on the 
extent to which the distribution of rents is aligned with formal rules but on the extent to which 
the distribution of rents matches the relative strength (the capacity for violence) of different 
groups controlled by the elites concerned. This means that politics in Limited Access Order is 
often unstable and individuals and organizations cannot credibly commit to observing formal 
rules. Nor is the pursuance of reforms that enforce more transparent systems of resource 
allocation within the state necessarily the best option for preserving stability within a ruling 
coalition. 
Nevertheless, even where formal rules are not observed, political stability can be achieved which 
can facilitate economic growth and development. Development progresses within the Limited 
Access Order as countries move from being a ‘fragile LAO’ with high levels of violence, to 
becoming what they define as a ‘basic LAO’ where government is fairly well established and 
violence is often latent and managed. In the final stage, a ‘mature LAO’ achieves less violence 
and more diverse and longer lasting organizations. These organizations start to have a vested 
interest in maintaining impersonal rules governing the relations between elites, establishing the 
foundation of the Open Access system. The direction and pace of this process is determined by 
the changes in the relative balance of power within the ruling coalition.     
  Transition from a Limited to an Open Access system involves attaining a set of ‘doorstep 
conditions’. These are the rule of law for elites, perpetually lived organizations in the public and 
private spheres, and consolidated control over the military. However, even with these conditions 
in place, the shift to a self-sustaining Open Access system is not guaranteed. North et al argue 
that ‘open access is not just around the corner, and modern democracy and economic 
development are not likely outcomes of a revolutionary struggle’ p (2012, 349). The transition 
between the two orders depends on a tipping point being reached in the number of independent 
organizations that have an interest in maintaining impersonal rules that restrict violence.   In 
Open Access Orders, violence is minimized by a completely different institutionalized incentive 
mechanism. Rather than elites benefitting from the creation of rents, in Open Access Orders 
elites maximize their own self interest by adherence to formal impersonal rules that set limits on 
organized violence and centralize the legal use of violence within the state. The Open Access 
Order relies on competition, open access to organizations and the rule of law to hold society 
together and to limit violence. This system depends on the emergence of a critical number of 
organizations that have an interest in maintaining impersonal relations; but, once in place, the 
Open Access Order generates a self-enforcing mechanism that ensures adherence to social 
norms and formal rules that limit violence and encourage competition. According to North et al, 
Open Access Orders are, therefore, more peaceful and also generate higher and more stable 
economic growth through economic competition.  
  While, ultimately, the emergence of an Open Access system provides a lasting solution to the 
problem of violence, very few contemporary countries are on the threshold of this transition. 
Instead, North et al argue that the most important problem within contemporary development is 
how to reduce violence within the political logic of the Limited Access Order. The standard 
governance reform agenda in developing countries that has focussed on strengthening the rule of 
law, liberalizing markets and improving accountability and transparency within the state cannot 
achieve these ends, according to North et al. Instead, governance reform in developing countries 
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needs to focus on how to support stable elite pacts. This would involve the acceptance of 
different types of formal and informal mechanisms that distribute rents to powerful elites. By 
generating stability, higher levels of investment will ensue and lead to an eventual transition to 
the Open Access system with higher rates of competition and lower levels of violence. North et 
al argue that the implications of the Access Order theory of development are profound. They 
suggest that the commitment to enhancing the formal mechanisms of governance in developing 
countries through the ‘good governance’ approach of strengthen the rule of law, improving 
democratic accountability and liberalizing markets have been fundamentally mistaken. Instead, 
development partners need to focus on the political implications of these reforms for the 
stability of the ruling coalition and the eventual emergence of enough organizations to create a 
new equilibrium that can sustain an Open Access Order.  
NORTH’S INTELLECTUAL JOURNEY   
The main theoretical content of Douglass North’s newest work on institutions is, on first 
assessment, both familiar and surprising. North argues that his latest work breaks from his 
existing opus in important ways. Nevertheless, the motivations and underlying questions that are 
addressed in Violence and Social Orders are very much consistent with his long term interests. 
These have been in explaining divergent economic performance across time and in the desire to 
improve and enrich the basic neo-classical model that he used in his early work to explain 
historical change with insights from a range of other disciplinary approaches. His expanding 
intellectual ambitions are reflected in the growing scope of his analysis, starting initially with a 
study of economic growth in the United States over a hundred year period (1961), to explaining 
the rise of the western world (1990) and finally to the formidable task of providing ‘a conceptual 
framework for interpreting recorded human history’ (2008).   
As the historical scope of his work has grown, his core theoretical concepts have also expanded 
beyond the initial confines of the neo-classical model, where changing economic performance 
was explained as a process of individuals responding to relative price changes. His early and most 
important theoretical innovation was, of course, the inclusion of transaction costs to explain the 
existence and persistence of institutions. North argued that the inclusion of transaction costs 
within his theoretical framework represents a break with his previous commitment to the 
neoclassical model. Nevertheless, a set of assumptions around methodological individualism, 
methodological optimization4 and the primacy of liberalized markets that derive from 
neoclassical principles have remained core to North’s understanding of society and the economy.  
  North’s early inclusion of transaction costs within his framework produced a set of 
functionalist models of historical change, for example, in North and Thomas (1973) economic 
development occurs as individuals respond to changes in relative prices and engage in a 
voluntary bargaining process over institutional change to lower transaction costs. These models 
are functionalist in the sense that they explain institutional change as being a result of their 
effects, as institutional change will only occur if it is value enhancing. This is because self-
interested individuals will only engage in voluntary bargaining to change institutions if the gainers 
can compensate losers at an agreed price that leaves them both better off. The path of 
institutional change will be, by definition, Pareto enhancing because only institutions that result 
in Pareto improvements can emerge.  
  North’s later models (1987, 1990, 1995) provide a richer account of political processes by 
bringing in the concept of the polity, organizations and belief systems to address issues of 
                                                          
4
 Thank you to the anonymous reviewer who pointed out that in Understanding the Process of Economic Change North 
acknowledges the importance of non-ergodicity and Knight-Keynes, the presence of which makes optimization 
difficult to operationalize.  
7 
 
collective action that he recognized as lacking within his earlier assumptions about the 
behavioural mechanisms that drive institutional change. His early work on the polity starts with 
the assumption that the state can be modelled as an individual ruler whose aim is to maximize his 
returns. North (1987) argues that the political process can be likened to a political market where 
political transaction costs can hinder the emergence of more efficient institutional arrangements. 
In Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990), he no longer presents the 
extractive state as the main agent of economic change. Instead, a central role is given to 
organizations that he defines as groups of individuals bound together by a common purpose. 
Organizations, therefore, become actors that behave like individuals and aim to maximize their 
benefits within the broader institutional framework5.  In the process of furthering their own 
objectives within the given institutional framework, organizations cause incremental institutional 
change which in turn shapes the path of economic development. Again, however, actual 
institutional change is a function of the level of political and economic transaction costs. In turn, 
the level of transaction cost depends on the types of institutional structure within which 
organizations operate. North remained committed to the idea that low transaction costs 
institutions are ones that facilitate political and economic exchange through Western style 
democracy and liberalized market systems. Questions of power were unimportant within this 
approach as all institutional changes involve voluntary agreement on the price of compensation 
for losses incurred as institutions are modified and the full payment to the losers once 
institutions are changed.  
The problem with all of these earlier models is that they could not adequately explain why the 
introduction of low transaction cost institutions in developing countries through governance 
reforms, democratization and market liberalization produced such variable economic results. 
Beyond formal institutions, North had always argued that informal institutions, such as social 
conventions, norms and beliefs were also important in explaining economic change. From the 
1990s, North increasingly argued that ideology and belief systems were more important to 
explaining divergent economic performance than formal institutions. The recognition of 
ideology opens up an opportunity for new institutional approaches to adopt a more rounded 
conception of human motivations. North remained committed to the idea that humans are 
acquisitive and constantly seek to maximize their utility; however, he no longer assumed that 
utilities were determined by fixed preference functions. Ideological commitments were 
recognized as creating distinct subjectivities that shaped human motivations. Nevertheless, while 
recognizing a plurality of human motivations, North maintains a commitment to the idea of 
rational optimization, albeit bounded within particular ideological parameters. 
The reason for this is that he uses the concept of ideology primarily as a form of informational 
constraint that affects the costs of transacting. For example, Denzau and North (1994) argue that 
certain forms of belief serve to lower transaction costs, while other belief systems make social 
interactions more costly and thus constrain economic development. Thus, they argue that poor 
economic performance and high levels of poverty are a result of the dominant belief systems 
prevalent in a country. North remains committed to the idea that, over time, incremental change 
to lower transaction costs will emerge as ‘individuals alter their ideological perspectives when 
their experiences are inconsistent with their ideology’ (1981, 49). However, he does not seek to 
explain how, or why, certain ideologies and belief systems emerge in the first place. As 
Rutherford (1994) argues, North leaves ideology as exogenous to his model of historical change. 
He does not seek to provide an historical context to the emergence of particular ideas. In his 
                                                          
5
 Hodgson (2006) argues that North was wrong to distinguish between organizations and institutions. Rather than 
playing the role of actors within an institutional framework, organizations depend on internal institutional rules and 
mechanisms to ensure compliance of members through coercion and persuasion. Organizations should therefore be 
considered as a specific type of institution rather than as a separate conceptual entity. 
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work from this same period, North also begins to discuss the role of violence in economic 
development as he attempts to deal with a more complex social reality than could be captured in 
the simple neo-classical model of his early work. At this stage in his work, however, the 
prevalence of violence in certain societies is explained as an outcome of particular belief systems 
and is thus treated as an exogenous constraint on economic performance. 
  A striking feature of North’s theories of economic development, and one of the most 
important reasons for the enormous appeal of his work across the social sciences, was that he 
presented his conceptual building blocks – institutions, organizations, beliefs - as universal 
categories (Fine and Milonakis 2007), not delimited by time or space. The universal benefit of 
these institutions to economic development was, of course, the theoretical bedrock of the good 
governance agenda. The Access Order theories conspicuously reject this previous commitment 
by arguing that the implications of particular institutional forms for economic development 
cannot be generalized but depend on the underlying social order. The idea of social order, 
originating in the work of Hobbes, has been central to political economy but, as a means of 
understanding economic performance in developing countries, it is perhaps most associated with 
the work of Samuel Huntingdon whose book Political Order in Changing Societies (1968) made the 
ethically dubious justification for authoritarian rule in developing countries.  
  In more recent years, a number of influential theorists such as Bates (2001) and Fukuyama 
(2005) have returned to framing economic development around the concept of social order. 
Building on Olson (1993), Bates argues that order is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 
long-run economic growth and social transformation. North’s joint work on order in the early 
2000s6 was similar to Bates’ in that they were both primarily concerned with the conditions 
under which order prevails over disorder rather than with how distinct social orders may affect 
patterns of economic development. North did, however, argue that stable orders can be either 
authoritarian or consensual but he did not, at this stage, articulate the difference between these 
systems as unique social orders under which institutions, organizations and beliefs operate in 
distinct ways to limit collective violence7.  
  The concept of social orders as representing unique and distinct types of societies only comes 
to the fore within North’s work after 2005. What is different in North’s use of the concept of 
social orders in his work after 2005 is that he assumes that the common analytical categories that 
have been the hallmark of his previous work on economic development – institutions, 
organizations and beliefs – have different economic and political implications in the three social 
orders that he argues cover the entirety of human history. While this may initially appear to be a 
break from the a-historical nature of his conceptual framework, the three orders do not refer to 
historically delimited periods of time. For example, the Limited Access Order includes the Aztec 
Empire as well as contemporary developing countries from Somalia to Brazil. Instead, each 
Order represents a unique incentive system with an internal logic that determines the impact of 
institutions, organizations and beliefs on socioeconomic change. North is certainly not arguing 
                                                          
6
 North’s engagement with the concept of order can be traced to a joint article with Barry Weingast et al in 2000 and 
a subsequent chapter by North entitled ‘Order and Disorder’ (North 2005) however from 2007 they distinguish 
between order and social order as two distinct concepts.  
7 Instead North argues that the features which distinguish these two systems are the extent to which 
decision makers are influenced by the formal and particularly the informal constraints of the system. 
Disorder in both authoritarian and consensual systems comes from either economic crises or incremental 
changes that reduce the effectiveness of the coercive enforcement of rules or norms of cooperation and, 
therefore, induce organizations to attempt to implement radical institutional change (North, 2005). 
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that these concepts can only be properly understood within specific historical contexts. Despite 
his expanding conceptual lexicon, his work exhibits consistency in terms of its most important 
features. Over time, North’s work has continued to explore complex social phenomenon but 
within an a-historical model where social change is driven by individual optimizing strategies and 
the pursuit of self-interest.  
 
VIOLENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF DEVELOPMENT 
While the basic conceptual elements of North’s previous work remain central to the Access 
Order theory of development, the main claim to theoretical innovation comes from the role 
given to violence in explaining social order and the path of economic transformation. North et 
al. go so far as to claim that the inclusion of violence within their framework achieves the elusive 
goal of integrating political and economic theory into a united analytical model of development 
(2009, xi). Social theories that explore the links between violence and development abound, but 
North et al explicitly position themselves as different from other contemporary approaches to 
the political economy of violence. Charles Tilly (1992), Geoffrey Parker (1996) and Robert Bates 
(2001) all argue, in various different ways, that military competition drove the emergence and 
consolidation of power the state. North et al argue that these approaches are flawed as they start 
from the assumption that the state is a single actor with an existing monopoly over violence. 
Tilly’s work, for example, focuses on how the capacity for violence of different states shaped 
societies and how relations between military and business were forged. Besley and Persson 
(2007) build on Tilly’s argument to show how investment in collective public goods linked to war 
helped to consolidate state building.  
In contrast, the Access Order theories start from the assumption that the capacity for violence is 
disbursed across different organizations in society rather than being held by a unified state entity. 
In the Access Order theories the state is treated as a coalition of organizations defined as the 
‘dominant coalition’, as it reflects the ability of particular groups of elites to coordinate with each 
other in the distribution of rents while excluding other less powerful elites. This frames the study 
of violence and development around how a particular dominant coalition sustains itself, rather 
than examining the impact of war on the capacities of the state. In the Open Access Order, the 
state does hold a monopoly on the use of violence but this is because elites have voluntarily 
decided to give up their capacities for violence to the state. The war and development theses 
place the experience of war, the deals forged between military and business groups and the 
material demands of war-making as central to explaining different trajectories of economic 
transformation. The Access Order theories, however, continue with North’s long term focus on 
the way that organizations and institutions affect the internal dynamics of collective action 
between groups who now need to find solutions to maximize their returns in the face of the 
inherent violence of other collective action groups.  
Previously, the understanding of human motivations within new institutional economics was 
based on the idea that individuals are driven to maximise self interest - although perceptions of 
self interest would be shaped by (unexplained) ideological commitments. In the new model, 
however, violence becomes central to their framework because humans do not simply seek to 
maximize their material position but also are genetically programmed to act in violent ways. 
Their framing of violence as a universal human characteristic with implications for various social 
phenomena has echoes of Hobbes (1651, 2008) and North et al emphasise this intellectual 
lineage by using the term the ‘natural state’ to refer to Limited Access Orders (2009). The idea 
that social order and a universal human propensity for violence are inextricably linked is also 
10 
 
prevalent in popular evolutionary psychology. For example Steven Pinker (2011) argues in a 
similar way to North et al, that Western societies constrain human beings’ natural inclination for 
violence. The simplistic agonistic notion of human nature in these approaches leaves no room 
for exploring the inherent tensions that exist within humans between our ability to be violent 
and our ability for nurture, protection and cooperation that are equally natural and important in 
shaping social institutions8.  
In terms of the relationship between North’s previous work and the Access Order approach, the 
inclusion of violence as an overarching constraint on group behaviour modifies the logic of 
collective action in important ways. The concept of violence is of importance to understanding 
development within the Open Access framework primarily because of its impact on the material 
interests of elites and its effects on the calculation of relative prices attached to different courses 
of action. The decision by elites to be violent depends on calculations as to whether the returns 
from their violent acts, in terms of their ability to control rents, outweigh the benefits of peaceful 
production in the absence of violence. The control of violence in any social order is important, 
according to their approach, because it creates uncertainty and destroys production; hence, there 
is a negative trade-off between the level of violence and the rate of economic development.  
Economic gains from violence do not result from the fact that violence itself can be a strategy of 
accumulation, as argued by Cramer (2006). Instead the economic benefits of violence relate to 
the redistributive impact on the distribution of rents. Similarly to the role of ideology in North’s 
earlier work, violence becomes a form of transaction cost within a model of society as a market 
where individuals bargain over courses of action to maximize profits. Violence acts as a 
fundamental constraint on optimization but unfettered optimization remains the correct 
counterfactual against which to assess human behaviour. North et al argue that once violence has 
been reduced through the incentive mechanisms of the Open Access Order, individuals are able 
to benefit from the unconstrained pursuit of individual optimization.  
Given that the claims to theoretical innovation hinge on the importance given to the concept of 
violence within their framework, a striking feature of the Access Order approach is how little 
insight we gain into the experience of violence in developing countries or across history from the 
theory. Indeed, description and analysis of war and violent conflicts are notably absent from 
their 2009 book. Violent political upheavals such as the French revolution, colonial conquests 
and the great wars of the 20th century play no part in their account of the transition between 
social orders or in their understanding of contemporary development. They argue that such 
violent events are unimportant in explaining social order as they often fail to lead to a 
fundamental change in the distribution of power between elites and do not change the 
underlying logic of competition within the order. In Violence and Social Orders they explain that 
this is because the latent capacities for violence affect politics just as much as actual violence. In 
developing countries, group violence is frequently latent but it still shapes the way that the 
dominant elite distributes rents and controls the economy. This raises obvious problems in terms 
of gauging levels of violence occurring in developing countries.  
The fact that North et al treat the threat of organized violence and actual violence as 
synonymous means that their framework is of little use in terms of exploring the phenomenon of 
violence itself. Their main focus is on the importance of collective violence but within that 
category the theory is blind to the distinction between forms of collective violence such a 
ritualistic violence, group hostility, broken negotiations or opportunistic brawls (Tilly 2003). The 
theory is silent on the consequences of violence for people’s lived experiences. Further, a proper 
examination of the motivations behind collective violence is precluded by their assumption that 
                                                          
8
 Hobbes is often wrongly characterized as arguing that our social orientation is unnatural. While he argued that 
humans exhibit egoism, they also strive to create the conditions for social harmony (Amato 2002). 
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the type of collective violence that is important for explaining social phenomena emerges from 
the accumulation strategies of elites. The relationship between elite accumulation strategies and 
violence is mediated through patron-client networks that they argue are the basis of politics in 
Limited Access Orders. Non-elites have little direct political agency in this model except as a 
rent-a-mob for elites. Interestingly, however, they argue that violence operates both within and 
across patron-client networks, moving away from the assumption that such networks are 
maintained by material interest alone. They argue that elites call on other elites to maintain 
discipline of non-elite groups as well as to suppress the emergence of other organizations that 
may threaten their control over rents. This opens the theory to a much more explicit engagement 
with the role of power in the dynamic relationships between elites and non-elites that was absent 
from North’s earlier work. But the idea also privileges reduction in some forms of violence over 
other forms as using violence to control non-elites can be justified on the basis of needing to 
achieve stability between elites.  
Ultimately, collective violence occurs when the distribution of rents is out of line with the 
violence capacity of different elite groups. This misalignment of the distribution of rents between 
elites can occur for a number of reasons that are endogenous to their model - such as economic 
performance, changes in the nature of rents and changes in the membership or balance of power 
within the dominant coalition as well as the nature of public policy. However, North et al 
explicitly exclude the international political and economic system from their analysis. The 
processes of change that the model does not seek to explain include changing relative prices, 
climatic events and technological change. More importantly, perhaps, the threats of violence 
from neighbours and the impact of geopolitical struggles remain outside their explanatory 
framework. Violence within OECD countries and the role of war-making by the rich countries 
of the world plays little role in their analysis as violence is assumed to play a minimal role within 
the politics of the Open Access Order. This means that the linkages and interplay between the 
apparent non-violent politics that generally characterises Open Access Orders and the violent 
politics of Limited Access Orders are ignored. The fundamental weakness in their conception of 
violence stems from their inadequate engagement with the role of violence as an instrument of 
power. On questions such as the historically rooted and variable relationship between violence 
and power, as well as the geopolitical context of war and violence in developing countries, the 
Access Order theory is worryingly silent.  
North et al argue that the most pressing issue in contemporary development is not how 
developing countries can transition to become Open Access Orders but how to reduce violence 
within the logic of the Limited Access Order. This implies a very different idea about the 
meaning of development from his earlier implicit association of development as a process of 
introducing and solidifying liberal political and economic institutions, in particular through 
liberalizing markets. In contrast, embedded within the Access Order theories is a 
conceptualization of development as a process of reducing violence. This chimes with the 
broader shift over the past decade towards a framing of development by international 
development institutions around the issues of security (Kaplan 1994, Hettne 2010). The 
implications for development policy of this shift in the definition of development are important. 
The types of institutions that promote economic efficiency and growth may be very different 
from the types of institutions that promote security in developing countries, as recognized by 
North et al. However, the institutions that constrain violence may also be very different from the 
institutions that best promote other aspects of human wellbeing, or indeed human freedom. A 
broader conception of development is necessary to examine the relationship between economic 
change, political order and human wellbeing. The Access Order theory does not provide this.  
 
THE PERFECT MARKET PRESERVED? 
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While the Access Order theory is an approach to development that appears to privilege 
economics by emphasizing the transactional nature of politics in developing countries, the model 
is surprisingly silent about the economic sphere; production, distribution, accumulation and 
economic growth are left largely unexplained within the framework. The reason for this lies in 
the continued dependence on a set of neo-classical economic assumptions about economic 
processes. Establishing the boundaries of a neoclassical approach is complicated by the fact that 
the field and practice of neoclassical economics has expanded and mutated over time since 
North’s earliest work. North’s institutional economics has reflected and has also, arguably, 
influenced the path of intellectual developments within mainstream economics over the past fifty 
years. Mainstream economics has moved away from some of the very restrictive assumptions 
around equilibrium, rationality, perfect information and marginal pricing towards a focus on 
complexity, experimentation and multiple equilibria9. Nevertheless, the Access Orders continue 
to be attached to a set of neoclassical assumptions about methodological individualism, 
methodological optimization (albeit subject to the constraint of violence) and the primacy of 
liberalized markets for promoting economic growth.  
Despite these aspects of continuity, the Access Order theories also reflect a shift in the 
understanding of the potential role for rents in economic development that is emerging amongst 
mainstream policy makers and academics. In classical political economy a rent was defined as the 
return to the ownership of an asset rather than to productive activity but in modern economics 
rents are defined as a return generated by political intervention to restrict the free market. North 
et al explicitly reject the understanding of rents associated with Krueger (1974) and Bhagwati 
(1982) who argue that rents are unproductive and lead to a deadweight loss to the economy. 
Instead North et al adopt a loser definition of rent as a return to an asset or action higher than 
the return to the next best opportunity that has been foregone. In North’s previous models, 
individuals were motivated to maximise rents but rent creation and attendant rent-seeking had a 
negative impact on economic performance (North 1990). However, in Violence and Social Order 
North et al explicitly reject this assumption. North et al recognize a variety of positive economic 
purposes of rent creation, from Schumpeterian rents to promote innovation to the role of rents 
in overcoming market failure (Schumpeter 1961, Stiglitz 1989).  
 
The potential positive role for rents that are generated by state interventions in markets has 
become much more widely accepted within development policy in recent years as the market 
fundamentalism of economic development policy under structural adjustment has given way to a 
broader acceptance of the potential role of the state in fostering economic development. This 
change reflects research into the experience of East Asian countries that achieved rapid rates of 
economic growth with significant support from the state in the form of technology and 
industrial policies (Amsden 1989, Wade 1990). The current economic consensus has therefore 
shifted towards an understanding that the state can play a positive role in economic development 
not only through the provision of stable market institutions but also through specific 
interventions to create rents and modify market prices (Lin 2012). The most important 
modification in the economic assumptions of the Access Order theories compared to earlier 
New Institutional models is in the understanding of the implication of rents for economic 
development. The primary function of rent creation within LAOs is to constrain violence. 
Individuals within the Access Order framework are still assumed to be driven by the basic desire 
to maximize rents; however, they argue that the dynamics of rent allocation within the dominant 
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coalition is crucial for controlling violence. Rent creation therefore gains a functionality that was 
absent in previous new institutional economic models. This has important implications for the 
policy advice that comes out of this framework: International development policy advice should 
move away from the ‘good governance’ recommendations on reducing rents and rent seeking, 
and instead should focus on finding the best way to distribute rents to reduce violence. In a 
break from previous NIE models they also recognize that rent creation can have a positive 
function within economic development, however this is only the case within Limited Access 
Orders. 
While opening the possibility for growth-enhancing rent creation by states, North et al maintain 
that economies of Open Access systems are more dynamic because of low and time-bound rent 
creation while rents created by states in developing countries tend to be driven by redistributive 
demands that hamper economic development. The actual examples of productive and 
unproductive rent creation that they use to illustrate the different economic implications of rents 
in Open and Limited Access Orders however suggest a conventional set of recommendations 
about economic and social policies in developing countries. For example, they argue that the free 
trade policies implemented under NAFTA helped to improve economic growth while trade 
union lobbying for increased wages led to unproductive rents that diminished economic growth. 
Hence the idea that moving to more competitive markets facilitates economic growth remains 
core to their underlying economic model. Further, they distinguish between social policies that 
create negative rents that involve ‘direct transfers, such as those to government employees, 
teachers, and guarantees to labour’ compared to social policies in Open Access Orders which 
involve public good provision that generates positive economic returns.’ (2009, 143).  
Rents have very different implications and functions in Open Access Orders. Rents exist in open 
Access Orders, they argue but they are not distorted by the need to mitigate the potential for 
organized violence of powerful groups. Their explanation for the dynamism of the economy in 
Open Access Orders comes from the higher level of competition that is generated by open 
access to create organizations and low transaction costs where unproductive rents are minimized.  
The Open Access Order is characterized as idealized system of competition where economic 
power has little influence over political decisions. The redistributive aspects of rent creation 
within Open Access Orders, such as protection of intellectual property rights or the protection 
given to companies through limited liability legislation remains unexplored. While power has a 
role in explaining the creation and distribution of rents within the Limited Access Order, the role 
of economic power of multinational companies and of monopolies is not considered to be an 
important factor within the political and economic decision making of Open Access systems. 
They argue that ‘In natural states, all big economic organizations are necessarily also political 
ones.  
In Open Access Orders, ‘big economic organizations typically concentrate far more on markets 
and are only tangentially involved in politics’ (269). This assumption means that the processes 
through which multinationals and powerful firms at a national level consolidate economic and 
political power within industrialized countries and use this influence to affect rent creation in 
developing countries through international trade and investment policies falls outside their 
explanatory framework. Thus, while recognizing the potential importance and implications of the 
concentration of economic power for the functioning of markets in Limited Access Orders, 
economic power is assumed to be unimportant for explaining economic outcomes in the Open 
Access Order due to open competition. In fact, the economic model of the Open Access system 
assumes an idealized form of competition between economic organizations in that mimics the 
perfect market counterfactual of neoclassical economics. Thus, the conceptual device of the 
Open Access Order allows a number of key features of the underlying neoclassical economic 
model to be preserved. The implications of this for development policy is to maintain the basic 
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hierarchy of institutional forms that was at the heart of the good governance agenda, while 
simultaneously avoiding the exploration the interconnections between the politics and 
economics of developed and developing countries.   
ACCESS ORDERS AND CAPITALIST TRANSITION  
On one level, the model of societal evolution within this framework appears to be the antithesis 
of the Marxist approach to explaining historical change as a process of transition between 
distinct modes of production driven by the contradictions that arise within the sphere of 
production. The concept of capitalism is notably absent from the Access Order framework. 
Nevertheless, in other respects there are ‘intriguing echoes of Marx as the back cover of Violence 
and Social Orders states (North et al 2009). This is perhaps not surprising as North was a self-
proclaimed Marxist before his conversion to neoclassical economics (Klein and Daza 2013). As 
with the Access Order theories, Marxist theory places conflict as central to explaining historical 
change. The nature of these conflicts, however, is determined by the social structure of 
production. This means that Marx does not restrict his analysis to class conflict alone but also 
discusses the historical role of intra-elite conflict, particularly between the emerging bourgeoisie 
(Marx 1978). The role of horizontal conflicts within a Marxist framework is taken further by 
Robert Brenner, whose work North praises (North 1986). For Brenner the transition to 
capitalism depended on the emergence of a free labour force which created the conditions for 
productivity increasing competition between capitalists. However, Brenner argues that this 
process was the unintended consequence of conflict over property rights that occurred between 
producers themselves rather than between vertical classes (Brenner 1985).  
Another recent approach to development that is also inspired, in part, by Brenner’s analysis of 
the original transition to capitalism in Europe, can be found in Mushtaq Khan’s work on political 
settlements and development (1995, 2004, 2010). Khan’s political settlement approach predates 
the Access Order theories and North et al. acknowledge the influence of his ideas on the 
development of their analytical framework (2009, xvi). Khan writes that ‘[a] political settlement is 
a combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms 
of economic and political viability’ (2010, 4). Similarly to the Access Order theories, Khan argues 
that the distribution of power across a broad range of developing countries lies significantly out 
of alignment with their formal institutions. The consequence of this is that powerful groups 
operate through informal routes, primarily through patron-client networks, to protect their 
political power and rights over income flows, including state generated rents. Where the 
distribution of these income flows is not in alignment with the underlying distribution of power, 
the stable clientelist political settlement will break down as powerful groups increasingly exercise 
their power through collective violence. Both theories, therefore, place patron-client networks 
and the distribution of rents as central to explaining political stability in developing countries. 
This generates the common conclusion that good governance reforms to institutions may 
directly hinder processes of political stabilization and constrain rather than promote economic 
development. 
While their insights into the determinants of political stability in developing countries are similar, 
other important aspects of their frameworks, namely, the drivers of transition and the underlying 
social and economic model in which they are based are different in important ways. The 
conceptual framework of the political settlements theory draws from historical materialism while 
the Open Access concepts are rooted in neoclassical economics and Weberian sociology. For 
example the Access Order theories use Weber’s concept of the power of personal charisma of 
leaders to explain the logic of patron-client politics in developing countries. In contrast, Political 
Settlements explains the dominance of neo-patrimonial forms of political power as the result of 
economic structure. Thus, in countries with a small capitalist sector few profits are generated and 
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states in developing countries lack sufficient resources to cover the high costs of maintaining 
effective formal institutions. The consequence of this is that powerful groups operate through 
informal routes to protect and generate income flows and to sustain their power, drawing on a 
range of socioeconomic factors including ideas, traditional hierarchies, force, institutions and the 
historical experience of organizing politically. 
The Access Order theories place the rise of impersonal relations as the key to explaining the 
effectiveness of formal institutions in OECD countries. In contrast, Khan explains the stability 
of these countries as a result of the capitalist structure of the economy (2010). Thus, the 
capitalist political settlement involves a distribution of power that is dominated by the high levels 
of profits generated by capitalists. Formal institutions, the most important of which are the 
protection of private capitalist property rights, are broadly aligned with and sustained by the 
social, economic and political power that capitalists have, based on capitalist profits. Although 
there may be significant forms of struggle between competing groups, redistribution occurs 
mainly through formal institutions. There is a re-enforcing relationship between the generation 
of profits from formal capitalist property rights and the availability of resources to sustain those 
rights. Formal institutions and rights dominate in that they underpin nearly all output and 
incomes and the distribution of power is therefore determined by the incomes generated by 
these formal institutions.  
The drivers of transition in the Political Settlements are also significantly different from the 
doorstep conditions of the Access Order outlined above. This is because Khan’s economic 
model draws from a conception of capitalism that is absent from the Limited Access framework. 
For Khan, the drivers of development depend not only the ways that political stability is attained 
but also relate to particular features of economic growth in the contemporary capitalist world. 
Technology acquisition becomes central to explaining the relative pace and direction of 
economic transition in the context of a global economic order where the scale and complexity of 
the industrial production process necessitates a period of learning and catch up. Further, 
economic development in Khan’s model requires the accumulation of capital and in developing 
countries this often occurs through processes of primitive accumulation, defined as the process 
of accumulation outside the formal market process where political power is used to privilege the 
accumulation activities of particular individuals. In contrast, the underlying economic model used 
in the Access Order theory remains tied to an essentially neo-classical model where economic 
development occurs through the gradual accumulation of factors of production primarily 
through formal market processes. A political settlements approach allows for a much more 
nuanced engagement with the relationship between political order and economic transformation.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Open Access theories are an influential and important new approach to examining contemporary 
processes of development. By examining the underlying reasons why institutions have very 
different implications for economic development in developed compared to developing 
countries, the Access Order theories serve to challenge many of the previous assumptions about 
institutions that were embedded within the dominant good governance agenda. In an intellectual 
career that spans over half a century, North has consistently argued that to enhance economic 
performance, countries should adopt low transaction costs institutions, organizations and belief 
systems that he identifies as the Western liberal political and economic model. In this sense, the 
Access Order theories do present an important break from North’s previous commitments to a 
particular path of institutional reform in developing countries.  
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The expanding engagement with a range of social phenomenon, most importantly violence and 
conflict, pushes new institutionalism further away from many of the basic assumptions of the 
neoclassical model.  The theories, therefore, present an opportunity for expanding debate within 
both policy and academic circles on the role of institutions and economic development. In terms 
of North’s own intellectual journey, these theories appear to represent a continued move away 
from his neoclassical roots. Yet the framework is remarkably silent on the sphere of the 
economy itself. This is because North et al. remain committed to an essentially a-historical 
conceptual framework where individual maximization through market-like transactions is 
assumed to be the main explanation for economic processes and human motivation. In this way, 
Access Order theories actually serve to re-articulate important underlying aspects of the 
neoclassical model. Through the conceptual device of the Open Access Order, the theory is able 
to re-assert the primacy of the neoclassical market model. Despite framing development around 
the concept of violence, the theory has very little to say about violence itself. Violence is reduced 
to a form of transaction cost that limits individual optimization strategies. These conceptual 
weaknesses mean that Access Order theories cannot adequately address the variety of, and 
difference between, societies: It is worth being cautious of the analytical value of a framework 
that explicitly places Tanzania in the 1970s in the same analytical category as Nazi Germany (see 
North et al, 2009).  
The emergence and appeal of the Access Order theory of development reflects the broader shift 
within the framing of development from a concern with the integration of countries within the 
process of economic globalization towards a narrative of controlling violence in developing 
countries. North’s earlier preoccupation with efficiency and economic growth as the important 
outcomes of development is replaced by an implicit definition of development as the control of 
violence. Development, therefore, becomes synonymous with security, with little consideration 
to the socioeconomic implications of achieving this. Policy interventions and institutional reform 
in developing countries that promote elite stability may be incompatible with other and, arguably, 
equally important aspects of development. Indeed, the Access Order approach could justify the 
support for repressive and anti-democratic elites on the assumption that such support is 
necessary to achieve long term developmental outcomes. The theory therefore serves to strip the 
progressive and transformatory potential out of development by ignoring accumulation and 
income distribution, by limiting politics to elite self-interest, by neglecting non-elite struggles and 
by remaining silent on how controlling violence may affect human capabilities, rights and 
freedom. 
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